clientelism in Indonesia. In the third, I turn to the ongoing experiment of radical decentralization in Indonesia and its initial effects on illegal logging. I conclude with a tentative look forward.
It should be made clear that I am not critical of decentralization.
I argue that decentralization is a necessary, but not a sufficient step to achieve greater accountability and sustainability. When controls from above are eliminated, it is important that checks from below are already in place. Without democracy, decentralization may compound the problems created by clientelist systems. The relationship between democracy and decentralization is partially reinforcing; decentralization first requires democracy to be effective, while decentralization deepens democracy by allowing local autonomy, greater responsiveness, and more effective representation. Decentralizing a clientelist system may simply cut the top off the pyramid, eliminating the central governments that held lower levels in check.
I: State & Society, Power & Structure
This section introduces two related concepts which help explain why illegal logging persists.
First, Migdal's 'weak state' approach illustrates why some countries lack control over policy sectors which are dominated by strong societal forces. Second, I discuss clientelism, a form of social organization which undermines state capacity and drives various forms of corruption, including illegal logging. This will lead me to a discussion of these concepts in the context of Indonesia.
In recent years, political scientists have attempted to 'bring the state back in'. Early political science was mostly concerned with a state's formal structures, but after World War Two, the discipline shifted to a society-oriented one. In the 1980s, a number of scholars spearheaded a return to formal theorizing about the state: its evolution, autonomy, capacity, and institutions.
While they demanded greater attention to the state, these scholars did not suggest a new grand theory at the expense of an emphasis on society. For Skocpol, "bringing the state back in…does not require a break with some of the most encompassing social-determinist assumptions of pluralism, structural functionalist developmentalism, and various neo-Marxisms." 2 As a result, political scientists increasingly view state and society as codetermined.
Migdal exemplifies state / society approaches. In Strong Societies and Weak States, he examines "the capabilities of states to achieve the kinds of changes that their leaders have Decentralization is only effective if democratization is successful; otherwise, it will weaken state capacity and entrench clientelist networks, leading to an increase in illegal logging.
II: Centralized Power & Illegal Logging in Indonesia
Having detailed the theories which drive this study, I discuss them in terms of an increasingly decentralized Indonesia. After describing the weak, clientelist, centralized state that was the New Order, I look at the environmental consequences. In the next section, I will detail Indonesia's radical decentralization and assess what this means for illegal logging.
For three centuries, the Dutch ruled the East Indies through local chiefs, but exercised direct control of rubber, tea, coffee, and sugar plantations. Dutch rule became increasingly centralized in the nineteenth century as high colonialism took hold in response to a series of conflicts. When Indonesia proclaimed its independence, the Dutch now demanded a federal system that could protect Christian enclaves, but Sukarno believed this would produce too much instability given ethnic and religious conflicts throughout thousands of islands. Sukarno "established continuity with the Dutch colonial administration, in which a central government presided over the regions." 12 The President faced strong opposition on this from Vice President Hatta, Muslim leaders, and regional military commanders. Sukarno began as a democrat, but as religious, ideological, and military rebellions grew, he shifted to 'Guided Democracy', a semiauthoritarian system in which Sukarno balanced the military and communist forces through strong executive rule. General Suharto took power through a 'creeping coup' after a muddled strike by communist leaders against the military, proclaiming a 'New Order' for Indonesia. 13 The New Order was not a dictatorship in the strictest sense, but rather an oligarchy.
Suharto did not rule directly. The "father of development" (Bapak Pembangunan) ensured that his extended family as well as friends from the business community and military were granted monopolies, state corporations, and government agencies. Suharto and his circle controlled access to every level of power, leashing political parties, NGOs, and religious organizations. In recent years, Indonesia has undertaken radical experiments in political institutions.
Decentralization was sought as a means to appease regional sentiments, make the government more responsive to local needs, and decrease the burden on Jakarta. Indonesian reforms are part of a global trend in which "local officials are thought to be more aware of local needs, better situated to respond to these needs, and more accountable to local constituents for the results."
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Decentralization is also a means to improve participatory democracy; because states are not likely to shrink, "other ways must be found to reduce the scale of democracy…this means federalism and regional autonomy." 20 But this is no golden key to progress. Although decentralization promotes participation and reduces the likelihood of dictatorship, it may also lead to "authoritarian enclaves" in peripheral regions if the central government and society are too weak. 21 We must not forget that Indonesia and several other countries became centralized regimes in partial response to overcome regional military units and avoid ethnic conflict. The stakes of decentralization are high, however the potential benefit to a large country riddled with separatism and incapacity appealed to reformers. a "Java-Outer Islands" dichotomy in which isolated governments retain characteristics and leaders from the New Order. 23 Rural areas lack political opposition, an effective civil society, or an independent media. As a result, "Suharto has gone, but those he favoured continue to flourish." 24 Due to a lack of pro-democracy forces, democratization has not changed clientelism a great deal in Outer Indonesia.
The ambiguity and pace of Indonesian decentralization has resulted in criticism. The
World Bank alleges that "two years in, it is unclear what has been decentralized." 25 First, district power is a residual of federal responsibilities, resulting in confusion. Second, state agencies and old laws have not been updated to reflect these changes. For instance, the Forestry Act still refers to provincial responsibilities which no longer exist. 26 Clashes between federal, provincial, and district authorities have become more common. Third, no minimum standards have been adopted for policies such as education, health, or resource extraction. Fourth, there is a lack of human and technical resources in district governments, creating low quality, weak governments, especially in rural areas. According to the World Bank, district governments are "very much a product of the New Order Regime…and without an authority figure, are free to pursue rent unchecked." 27 They add that "big ticket corruption may have fallen in absolute terms, while petty corruption under weaker political management may have increased." How should we react to disparate reports on institutional change in Indonesia? To assess the effects of decentralization on state capacity, the state must be disaggregated by administrative level. The central government is strongest due to its expertise, skilled leadership, and economy of scale. With each step towards local government, society's power grows in relation to the state.
Especially in a country which has so quickly devolved responsibility to an increasing number of district governments, governments lack the ability to compete with strong societal actors such as corporations, and may even be captured by them. Remote district-level governments lack expertise, stable sources of revenue, and strong societal actors such as civil society or the media, but have nonetheless gained substantial powers. Local strongmen and logging companies dominate a number of particularly weak states at the district level. This presents a serious challenge to reformers, and has serious implications in many policy sectors.
Forestry provides an excellent avenue to assess Indonesian reforms. The industry dominates the most remote, least democratic regions, and involves strong stakeholders who resist change. Although difficult to measure, illegal forestry leaves a deeper footprint than do other sectors. Since the fall of Suharto, forestry is "undergoing a transformation to become more fragmented and disorderly…Forestry corruption is being reshaped by the democratic transition and 'messy' decentralization." 29 Meanwhile, district governments have become "more dependent on resource-based revenues [creating] incentives to accelerate land conversion and natural resource exploitation." 30 Reforms have made forestry revenue especially crucial to the most under-funded Kabupaten, which lack the will or the capacity to enforce environmental standards. As a result, illegal logging continues in specific regions throughout the country.
As noted in Figure Three , official logging has declined since the fall of Suharto. But
Indonesia's Department of Forestry's annual report demonstrates that official statistics vary wildly. 31 According to environmental NGO WALHI, illegal logging now varies considerably by district. 32 It seems that logging has increased, but official logging has decreased, suggesting that the state remains incapable of asserting control in this policy area. Although it is too early to tell if five years of reform have made significant changes in forest management, there are a few indicators available. 33 An important indicator is the shift from the HPH (Hak Pengusahaan Hutan, Natural Forest Concession) to the HPHH (Hak Pemungutan Hasil Hutan, Forest Product Harvest License)
system. The number of HPH have fallen from a dozen to zero in North Sumatra since 1998, whereas HPHH, smaller concessions granted by district governments, increased a thousand fold.
In 2000, the Ministry of Forests realized that HPHH grants were out of control and rescinded the law, but many district heads (Bupati) ignored the ruling, claiming their right to local revenues. 34 The HPHH windfall and subsequent spike in logging was heaviest in Kalimantan and Papua, the most remote and logging-dependent regions in the country.
Early evidence points towards tremendous fluctuation in permit grants according to direct elections for Bupati. In Tapanuli Selatan (TAPSEL) district in North Sumatra, the changeover of Bupati from Saleh Harahap to Ongku Hasibuan has brought tremendous changes in forestry management. 35 In Langkat district in the same province, local elections have not been held yet because the Bupati was appointed just before the new laws took effect, and accordingly, has some of the worst levels of illegal logging in the country. 36 The same pattern is evident in Aceh,
where because of the conflict, Bupati elections only took place in December 2006, and in a handful of districts not until 2008. Post-tsunami reconstruction has been partially undermined by illegal logging controlled by district heads. 37 The longer the duration between decentralization and elections, the more difficult it may be to curb illegal logging, as districts without changes in governments have had longer to appoint forestry officers and distribute multi-year forestry concessions. Decentralization seems to be paying dividends in regions that had early Bupati elections. These regions have seen more arrests, active forestry police, fewer concessions, and stricter monitoring. Without a change in local politics, decentralization can allow the inmates to run the asylum.
According to Larry Diamond:
Where hierarchical chains of particularistic, patron-client relationships are already the dominant mode of politics, shifting discretionary financial authority from the central to the local level may simply shift the locus of clientelism and corruption from the central to the local arena, making these problems even tougher to control because of the absence of the strong parties and countervailing interests that are found at the national level. 41 Kang makes similar observations in South Korea; authoritarian governments "eliminated the middleman, and while you had to pay for access, you could do it at the top levels, and not worry so much about the bureaucracy." 42 This phenomenon has also been documented in Eastern Russia. 43 Where democratization is ineffective, decentralization entrenches clientelism. Where democracy works, decentralization does as well. In large developing countries, each outcome will likely be found due to inequalities between districts.
For decades, Indonesia has been a weak, clientelist state. Democratization has brought many reforms, removed corrupt leaders, and entrenched the rule of law. Decentralization has enhanced democracy through greater participation and local leadership. Indonesian reforms are largely premised on the ability of "civil society organizations and the media [to] monitor and criticize government performance." 44 The World Bank notes that while government monitoring of illegal logging has decreased, civil society control has become a valid contributor in its place. 45 But where democracy and civil society are weak, the ghosts of the New Order remain.
Clientelism and state incapacity are still prominent, made worse by decentralization, which has granted substantial power to local strongmen. Illegal logging provides an avenue to gauge the effects of decentralization on state capacity and clientelism, as well as discuss important ecological issues.
Thus far, evidence of the effects of decentralization is anecdotal and mixed. It is too early to be sure what the effects of district political power will be on the environment or state capacity. It seems clear that some districts have benefited from local elections, improving forestry management even in the eyes of critical local NGOs. It is also safe to say that decentralization has entrenched clientelism in remote regions. More research is necessary as decentralization progresses to clarify the direction of democratization in remote districts.
Possible solutions may include greater federal oversight, clearer environmental laws, rotating bureaucrats from more prosperous regions, provincial policing, empowering civil society, rural education, or greater foreign pressure on corporations. While much remains to be done, the importance of the study is clear. The intersection of democratization and decentralization has concrete policy implications for environmental sustainability, local government accountability, and academic importance for several bodies of theory.
1 The project will explore variation among sub-national government capacity to curb illegal logging in Indonesia. It focuses on subnational units at various levels of government and in a range of provinces. Tentative cases include the province of North Sumatra, a district in Aceh, two districts and one sub-district in East Kalimantan, and one district and two sub-districts in South Kalimantan. I expect the greatest variation to be at the district level, however I also disaggregate districts into sub-districts to gauge variation among specific villages. My approach is influenced by Atul Kohli's study of political disorder in India. Kohli believes that "any satisfactory account of India's changing authority patterns must focus simultaneously on the center, the states, and local politics." Not only does Kohli study various levels of government, he ensures variation among them according to level of development and form of instability. For Indonesia, Aceh represents a resource-rich region impoverished by military rule. North Sumatra represents a stable, relatively prosperous case with an active civil society. East Kalimantan has a diversified economy which includes oil deposits, as well as overland routes to Malaysia which facilitate illegal logging. South Kalimantan's economy is more dependent on forestry, isolated, and home to a greater degree of traditional rule. For each, forestry is central to the economy. Atul Kohli, Democracy and Discontent: India's Growing Crisis of Governability (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 11.
